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New Republic

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE IS DEAD

AN EDITORIAL

FAIR DEAL ECONOMICS

By RICHARD A. LESTER

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

By NORMAN MacKENZIE

***HAROLD L. ICKES ON:
THE FORMOSA ISSUE***

A Series of Four Editorials on **ATOM CONTROL**

"Perhaps your five concrete suggestions may assist in the continuing effort at cooperation among the nations and in determining whether there is 'a better and more effective plan.'" WARREN R. AUSTIN

Beginning in February the *New Republic* will print a series of four consecutive editorials on what is the most urgent question of this era: international control of atomic energy.

The series will constitute one of the most difficult and most challenging journalistic efforts in the magazine's history. In its preparation, the editors will have the assistance and advice of highly qualified technical and theoretical experts.

On November 7 the *New Republic* printed an editorial called "A Proposal for Economic Peace." It was a call for reexamination of our position on the Baruch Plan and it made five concrete suggestions. Senator Austin, our Representative to the UN, (quoted above), Mr. Leonard Pearson, the Canadian delegate, and others at Lake Success welcomed the editorial as an aid in making a fresh start in negotiations now that Russia possesses the bomb. An editorial in the *Washington Post* commented on "A Proposal for Atomic Peace," as did Hanson Baldwin in the *New York Times*, Peter Kihss in the *Herald Tribune* and numerous other editors and writers.

There have also appeared in recent weeks the proposals of the American Society of Friends and the widely discussed recommendations of Brig. Gen. Carlos Romulo. Public opinion is being prepared and must now more energetically be prepared for an understanding of this complex problem and for a prompt solution if a catastrophic atom-weapons race is to be averted.

To assist in this most needed task the *New Republic* series of editorials was planned and can now be announced.

Editorial No. 1 will deal with the essentials of atomic physics as they relate to production processes for military weapons and for the production of power and other peaceful uses. It will restate the facts and reasonable approximations, drawn from public sources, on such critical questions as the amount of fissionable material required for bombs and reactors, the quantitative relations between plutonium production and the potential output of electric power and the number of bombs required for significant results in a major war.

Editorial No. 2 will discuss the political and technical problems of armament control; the similarities and differences between the treaty to outlaw atomic weapons urged by the Soviets and such earlier efforts as the Washington Naval Treaty of 1921, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. It will attempt, through historical perspective, to assess the practical and political value of international negotiations on atomic energy.

Editorial No. 3 will describe briefly the nature of the original US proposals on atomic control and recapitulate the important points and episodes in the deliberations in the Atomic Energy Commission of the UN.

Editorial No. 4 will deal with the actual situation and the possibilities of a new, workable pattern for a control system. The proposals of the November 7 editorial will be amplified and will be related to the general military and political state of the world, and in particular to the question of the future of Germany and Japan.

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WASHINGTON WIRE

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ONE-THIRD of all American families now spend more than they earn. "While personal saving in 1949 was high by any previous peacetime standards," said Truman in his Economic Report, "it is estimated that about one-third of all families did not add to their savings, but instead spent more than they earned."

Truman's Council of Economic Advisers puts the figure higher. Families in the lowest-two-fifths income bracket of the nation are now spending more than they take in, it declares.

This can't last. Something has to give somewhere. The \$5 billion Treasury deficit is peanuts compared to the deficit of one-third of America's low-income families. They don't care if the federal budget is balanced; they can't balance their own budgets.

Are they spendthrifts? Some are. But a recent Congressional report showed that 10 million families still have cash incomes of \$2,000 or less. Unemployment and hard times have had their effect.

That's why we have a federal budget deficit. It's the old struggle between Haves and Have-nots. "Balance the budget," cry the Haves. What they mean is, cut down social welfare. Reply the Have-nots: "We want social welfare, and more of it." Truman has cast his lot with the Have-nots; he couldn't cut welfare programs if he wanted to, and he doesn't want to.

The Haves can block new taxes in Congress which, of course, would fall principally on them. (The Haves got the \$5 billion tax cut from the sympathetic GOP 80th Congress. Without that cut the budget would be balanced today.)

That's how the situation stands: welfare legislation is going on—and for the time being there won't be adequate taxes to finance it, hence the deficit. Truman optimistically argues

that rising national economy will solve everything. While the immediate future looks rosy, it's doubtful after that because of the very disparity in income distribution. The funny thing is that while a third of the families were going into debt, 1949 savings as a whole increased over 1948. Why? Because of increased savings in the upper income brackets.

Meanwhile Truman's opponents are attacking him for "buying" votes with social welfare. The idea is that it's morally reprehensible to aid the masses because it may aid you politically.

For the life of them, the slow-witted Republicans can't think of any appeal to the masses on their own hook: Let them eat economy, they say.



The big Taft-Acheson foreign-policy exchange cleared the air. Taft's aggressive intervention in foreign affairs is important. He has been the GOP leader on domestic issues; now, with Vandenberg's illness and Dulles' defeat, Taft is restlessly moving into the foreign field. On his attitude toward Europe, Taft is at heart, we believe, pretty much an isolationist. The curiosity is that intervention now is a form of isolationism; an effort to reduce interest in Europe by turning attention to the Pacific. All during the war the Hearst-McCormick press tried the same thing.

Long-smoldering differences between the five National Labor Relations Board members and general counsel Robert Denham have reached open fire. The section of the Taft-Hartley Act giving the counsel virtually independent power was attacked by critics from the start as absurd administrative practice. Now Taft-man Denham has attacked the Board members at a dinner of the Building Trade Employers' Association in New York, urging the Association to appeal Board

rulings (which he is presumably hired to defend) to the courts.

Notes. Democratic attention is turning to New England: Truman's messages had a lot to say about federal water-power aid there; now comes an effort to get a big regional steel mill started in the Northeast over the steel companies' opposition. . . . The O'Mahoney Joint Committee on the Economic Report will call US Steel head Ben Fairless as the opening witness January 24 in hearings on the recent steel price boost; this follows the bitter but little noticed attack by Truman's economic advisers on the same increase in their report.

Florida's conservative Representative Smathers has formally entered the polls against liberal Senator Pepper, fulminating against "Socialism and Communism" and extolling the Taft-Hartley Act. . . . A five-man panel under able Senator Douglas (D, Ill.) backed Marriner Eccles against Treasury Secretary Snyder; Snyder wants to keep interest on the huge US debt low, but Eccles (the strongest voice on the Reserve Board, though demoted by Truman) solemnly warns that this means inflationary "easy money" for the whole country. . . . We predict that the oleomargarine bill will pass and that Senator Pat McCarran's (D, Nev.) efforts to block the DP bill will fail.

Every real-estate lobby in the country is mobilizing against rent-control continuation; their strategy is to cut Housing Expediter Tighe Woods's funds. . . . The press paid little attention to the unanimous House Committee finding that the charges of corruption in super-bomber B-36 procurement were utter phonies, yet when these Navy-inspired charges were made they shook the country and will leave a vague impression with millions that something's wrong in Washington. . . . The efforts to restore the autocratic House Rules Committee's veto power is the latest example of the GOP-Dixiecrat coalition that has helped to set aside the Presidential electoral verdict of 1948.

Washington

T. R. B.

CORRESPONDENCE

Survival by Sabotage

SIR: Your issue, "The State of the Union" (January 16), contains a curious discrepancy. On one page you advocate conservation of our natural resources, and on another you urge increased production in order to "give" employment to the poor. Nowhere do you advocate the rationing of irreplaceable materials to make our civilization last a little longer. The waste of iron, for such uses as houses and beer cans, for which more abundant materials such as glass and masonry can be used, is scandalous. The multiplication of cars, television sets and other luxuries helps to keep people employed, but it might be better to force the use of more primitive devices . . . than to displace so much labor by machinery that a few can produce enough for all, and the rest have to be supported by some sort of dole.

Oxford, Pa.

A. CRAIG

Responsibility in Science

SIR: In your December 12, 1949, issue you printed a letter by Herbert Jehle in which he sets forth the dilemma he is placed in by being at once a scientist and a pacifist. The question he raises is of great importance to many scientists here and abroad. It is a problem even broader than that mentioned by Jehle: Does an individual—scientist or otherwise—carry the responsibility for his professional activities or can he absolve his conscience by saying that he was ordered by his employer or his government to carry out certain work?

By our verdict in the Nuremberg trials, which was accepted by most Americans, we established such responsibility. If we accept such responsibility, should a scientist engage in armament work, knowing that in a modern war the weapons which he designs or improves must necessarily be employed against the military and civilians alike? Then the reasoning that war in democratic countries is waged only in self-defense becomes invalid; self-defense cannot comprise the killing of innocent women and children.

A number of scientists here and abroad, recognizing the above responsibility and having decided to put their professional skills only to constructive tasks, have banded together in the "Society for Social Responsibility in Science." It is left to the individual conscience to define the borderline between constructive and destructive activity; it is essential only that the member draws

a distinction and then acts accordingly.

Scientists who thus refrain from working on "destructive" projects will lend their skills only to "constructive" aims to improve the material well-being of mankind. It is recognized that in some instances the same work can be considered "destructive" by one man and "constructive" by another because the scientific findings can be applied to various purposes. People in sympathy with these aims, or scientists who cannot fully go along, are welcome as associates.

Neshanic Sta., N. J. VICTOR PASCHKIS

Peace and Sovereignty

SIR: We may deplore the fact, but we cannot change it, that our former isolationist policy is obsolete. Like it or not, due to modern techniques of transportation and communication, we have become One World.

In recognition of this fact, 103 Representatives have sponsored a concurrent Resolution to strengthen the UN into a world federal government with powers strictly limited to the prevention of war. These Representatives ask that the establishment of such a government be a definite part of our foreign policy. Twenty-three Senators concur in the belief that this should be done. Twenty-two states have passed Resolutions to the same effect. The once scarcely discernible trend toward world federation has become a powerful movement.

Those reactionaries who oppose the whole idea base their opposition on the fact that the US, by entering into such a federation, will be forced to surrender its sovereignty. We shall indeed be required to relinquish a small portion of our nationalism, our sovereign right to wage aggressive war. However, as we lie beneath the debris after the atom bomb has dropped, the knowledge that we have retained this particular and dubious sovereign privilege would seem to be of questionable comfort.

We have already tragically lost that sovereignty which is of the greatest importance—sovereignty over our internal affairs.

It is not we who determine our tax rate. This is arbitrarily fixed by other powers who make the arms race necessary.

It is not we who will make the decision as to whether we engage in war. The decision rests with another power.

It may well be that by our participation in a limited world government, by the sacrifice of our needless national right to wage aggressive war, we may restore again to our country that true sovereignty over our own lives which has been recently misplaced. . . .

Pittsburgh, Pa.

E. GARDINER NEAL



THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE IS DEAD

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE is dead. It has been officially buried by its principal author, Dean Acheson. May it rest in peace.

In its three years of life the Truman Doctrine caused infinite harm. It led the world to believe that America had the resources and the will to prop up every rotten regime that raised the anti-Soviet skull and crossbones. It led Americans to believe that we had the power and the opportunity to rule the world. It led Henry Wallace to forsake the Fair Deal. It led far more Americans to forsake conscience and common sense.

"It must be the policy of the United States," said President Truman on March 12, 1947, "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." This concept committed America to a policy sterile in its anti-Communism, blind in its adventurism and unenforceable in its insistence on universal containment of Russia.

In Asia, above all places the one where allegiance to the Great Powers is lacking and economic margins are too narrow to support the cold war, the Truman Doctrine was alien and harsh. Appropriately, it was Asia that exposed the false assumptions of the Truman Doctrine and brought its superstructure of illusions crashing down.

Faithful to the Truman Doctrine, its Republican converts proposed action to hold Formosa that was sterile, unenforceable and adventurist. President Truman rejected their whole approach. Now Secretary Acheson has cut the Truman Doctrine's mortal coils. His extemporaneous speech before the National Press Club declared a new policy for Asia and stands beside Secretary Marshall's Harvard address as a landmark in America's growth to maturity.

Acheson lays aside the Truman Doctrine's emphasis on military intervention in Formosa as a "silly adventure." In place of adventurism and overextension of our power, he offers for America the modest doctrine of the missing component:

American assistance can be effective when it is the missing component . . . which if put into the rest of the picture will spell success. . . . The United States cannot furnish all the components to solve the question. It cannot

furnish determination, it cannot furnish the will, it cannot furnish the loyalty of a people to its government. . . . We are willing to help, but we can help only where we are wanted and only where the conditions of help are really sensible and possible.

Next, Acheson lays aside the Truman Doctrine's insistence on a surface consistency of universal opposition to Communist pressure:

There are those who insist that we must always act in exactly the same way in every country in the world, and if we don't somebody rings up score one on the cash register. . . . That is a very false trend. . . . If it is to American interests, or those wider interests which affect us, to do one thing in one country and another thing in another country, then that is the consistency upon which I propose to advise the President.

Last, Acheson lays aside the Truman Doctrine's negative philosophy:

I hear almost every day someone say that the real interest of the United States is to stop the spread of Communism. Nothing seems to me to put the cart before the horse more completely than that. . . . Our interest is in people as people. . . . We are interested in stopping the spread of Communism because . . . it would take from people what they won, what we want them to keep and to develop . . . their own national independence, their own individual independence, their own development of their own resources for their own good. . . . It is important to take this attitude, not as a mere reaction to Communism, but as the most positive affirmation of the most affirmative truth that we hold, which is the dignity and the right of every nation, of every people, of every individual to develop in their own way, making their own mistakes, reaching their own triumphs, but acting under their own responsibilities. That is what we are pressing for in the Far East and that is what we must affirm.

This is the long-range approach that alone can save Western democracy. At once Acheson applies it in Asia in the spirit: *that which you wish to possess you must first let go.*

"A new day has dawned in Asia," Acheson asserts. "The Asian peoples are on their own and know it and intend to continue on their own. . . . The old relationships of East and West are gone. . . ."

America's new policy in Asia follows new principles. Our first principle is recognition, in Acheson's words, that "resignation is no longer the typical emotion of Asia. It has given way to hope, to a sense of effort . . . to a real sense of anger." Asia is in revolt "against the acceptance of misery and poverty as the normal condition of life," and "against foreign domination. . . . They have had enough of it and they want no more."

Our second principle is that American policy cannot stem this revolution. Acheson spells that out in analyzing the collapse of the Kuomintang:

Stop looking under the bed and under the chair and under the rug to find out the reasons. . . . Look at the picture. . . .

After the war, Chiang Kai-shek emerged as the undisputed leader of the Chinese people. He had overwhelming military power. He had tremendous economic and military support and backing from the United States. . . . Four years later he is a refugee. . . .

No one says that vast armies moved out of the hills and defeated him. To attribute this to the inadequacy of American aid is only to point out the depth and power of the forces which were miscalculated or ignored. What has happened is that the almost inexhaustible patience of the Chinese people in their misery ended. They did not bother to overthrow this government. They simply ignored it. . . . They took the solution of their immediate village problems into their own hands.

Third, it is American policy to recognize Communism's base of support in Asia today. Acheson continues with his analysis of the collapse of Kuomintang China:

The Communists did not create this condition. They did not create this revolutionary spirit. They did not create the great force that moved out from under Chiang Kai-shek. But they were shrewd and cunning enough to mount it, to ride it into victory and power.

Acheson's fourth assumption is that in Asia Soviet Russia is inherently expansionist, inherently imperialist, inherently incapable of treating the peoples of Asia as equals. Russia for this reason *must* come into conflict with the basic revolutionary movements of Asia.

"Communism," according to Acheson, has simply "added new methods, new skills and new concepts to the thrust of Russian imperialism. . . . The Soviet Union is detaching the northern provinces of China from China and is attaching them to the Soviet Union. This process is complete in Outer Mongolia. It is nearly complete in Manchuria." It is progressing in Inner Mongolia and in Sinkiang. It turns the Communist Parties into instruments of national betrayal "with the most awful responsibility, which they must pay for."

To Acheson, the appropriation of the northern provinces of China by Russia is "the single most important fact in the relation of any foreign power with Asia." It follows that the first rule of American policy is to do nothing "to obscure the reality of this fact. . . . We must not seize the unenviable position which the Russians have carved out for themselves: We must not undertake to deflect from the Russians to ourselves the righteous anger, the wrath and the hatred of the Chinese which must develop. . . . We must take the position . . . that anyone who violates the integrity of China is the enemy of China and is acting contrary to our own interest." America must undertake to hold a military line in the North Pacific. But we must not "become obsessed with military considerations"; and we must realize that beyond this military defense line "our opportunity is much slighter, and our responsibilities . . . are very small." Economic aid is the missing component that can guarantee Asia's development toward independence and democracy.

This new spirit expressed by Secretary Acheson is far more important than his specific proposals. If it is to prevail it must overcome both the arrogance fostered by our interventions in Asia and the defeatism and isolationism resulting from their failures.

In addition, the peoples of Asia have learned to distrust statements of intention. To persuade the governments of France, the Netherlands, Britain and the US to act entirely in this new spirit will be in itself a major endeavor. But governments are a minor aspect of the impact of the West on Asia. Government officials in the past have existed largely to enforce the property rights and wage relationships imposed by the Western monopolies of tin, rubber and other vital resources. If government attitudes change today while patterns of economic exploitation remain, then the change among governments will be of no consequence.

The second test of Acheson's new policy is its challenge to the political maturity of the American people. They have learned to distinguish between Communists and progressives. Can they distinguish between Communist-type revolutions and Kremlin-directed revolutions?

There is no middle class in Asia. There is no tradition of due process, of belief in law, of equality among citizens, of participation in government. The new leaders of Indonesia are far from being democrats. The leader of Western culture in Asia, Jawaharlal Nehru, faces desperate trials. The Socialists of India, ineffective today, may take up Mao Tse-tung's techniques of organizing the peasants. The finest patriots of Indo-China may swear allegiance to Marxism.

Moreover, the new nations of Asia are determined to be neutral between America and Russia. They distrust both powers. Far more important, they are engrossed in internal problems, as America was in the early days of our Republic. Like the America of that time, and for the same reasons, they can afford no entangling alliances.

The heart of Acheson's new policy in Asia is its refusal to intervene, its insistence on tolerance, its encouragement of dissent. Its natural result will be to create a Third Force in Asia, of nations not democratic and not dictatorial, not bound to the West, and not satellites of Russia. Then, if Russia continues to press outwards while the West refuses to exert pressure, these nations will move to the side of the democracies. The policy succeeds or fails according to the patience and tolerance of the American people.

In Southeast Asia, as Acheson wisely recognizes, we have no choice but to be patient. In Northern Asia he has drawn a vital defense line "which must and will be held." This is the weakest part of his new policy of political tolerance, for within the line are three self-willed peoples, in South Korea, the Philippines and Japan.

In South Korea we have largely failed. We have not sponsored a democratic revolution. There is little hope that independence or democracy will follow our departure.

In the Philippines we have set up a sovereign state. We have given it \$2 billion since the war's end. The money has been squandered. The problems of unrest, and unbalance in foreign trade are unsolved and increasing. The government is incompetent and corrupt.

In Japan we have been committed to a peace treaty, concluded with the participation of Russia and intended to leave Japan neutralized and disarmed. Now MacArthur has endorsed a Japanese defensive force, and Acheson declares that "there is no intention of abandoning or weakening the defenses of Japan and whatever arrangements are to be made, either through permanent settlement or otherwise, that defense must and shall be maintained." This decision makes settlement of the cold war with Russia more remote and raises grave issues of the course of action to be followed by America when the occupation ends and the Japanese revert to some of their prewar ways.

In Northern Asia, are we prepared to let these peoples make their own mistakes?

A further test of the maturity of Americans is in our attitudes toward world Communism. Had Acheson spoken a year ago, we would be morally bound to back Ho Chi-minh in Indo-China. We are bound now

to recognize the new government of China and to encourage its trade with Japan. Yet Acheson's belief that nations can be allowed to make their own mistakes trips up on the fact that no modern Communist regime, once established, has ever been driven from power.

China is being dismembered. Russian agents are moving south of the wall to manage China's railroads, to plan the invasion of Formosa, to see that no new Chiang Kai-shek emerges from the ranks of victorious Red generals. The Russians are taking wheat from North China at a time when the Chinese are eating bark.

Our hope must be that Russia will become overextended and that Asia will produce many Titos. Their emergence depends quite largely on our self-restraint, our tolerance, and our ability to make use of every advantage through trade and cultural interchange. As in Yugoslavia, we can say only: *If you want our help, we are available.*

In many ways the new spirit that Acheson proposes conflicts with the impatient and impulsive character of the American people. Those who insist on opposition at any price are bound to fight against this policy. Yet the main body of Republicans has not followed Taft's example. Henry Wallace and the non-Communists of the Progressive Party are likely, after the President's State of the Union message and Acheson's speech, to end their die-hard fight against the Fair Deal.

It took three weeks of ugly charges and wild confusion to produce Acheson's speech. Now the speech has made worthwhile Senator Knowland's attack and the entire debate. Once again it has taken a burst of irresponsible and destructive criticism to bring about much needed public enlightenment on a vital issue.

Knowland touched off a valuable debate. Yet democracy needs better mechanisms to keep itself informed. Caught in political crossfire at a critical moment, Acheson seems suddenly to have recognized the need. He says of America's policies:

"If these policies are to be good they must grow out of the fundamental attitudes of our people. If they are to be effective they must become articulate . . . through the press, through the radio, through the churches, through the labor unions, through the business organizations, through all the groupings of our national life."

Here at last is recognition of our central problem. Where is an understanding of the answer? One great advocate does not bring the State Department close to the people, and one brilliant speech does not end the debate.

THE WEEK

THE WIRE-TAPPING QUESTION

The dirty business of tapping private telephones has been suggested as a good topic for Congressional investigation. The Americans for Democratic Action and the American Civil Liberties Union called on the Senate Judiciary Committee to consider the power of the government to employ wire-tapping to obtain evidence or leads to evidence; the extent of wire-tapping, and the Federal Communications Act in this regard. ADA and ACLU officials stated that "fundamental rights such as confidential communications between attorney and client, husband and wife, parent and child, doctor and patient, minister and parishioner seem to be in jeopardy."

James L. Fly, former chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, also called for an investigation of the FBI's "wholesale" use of wire-tapping. "The FBI says there have been 'hundreds of cases.' I say there have been thousands of illegal taps." There are dangers to democracy, Fly said, "in secrecy and unaccountability at the seat of government, and in the FBI efforts to create a thought-control and guilt-by-association enforcement mechanism."

HOUSING HOPE

There is an excellent chance that the Administration's new middle-income housing program will be approved by the Senate before the end of this month. Last year, when Senator John Sparkman (D, Ala.) and Representative Helen Gahagan Douglas (D, Calif.) and others in the House introduced a bill to spur construction of homes for families earning \$2,700 to \$4,400 a year, the White House would have no part of it. The cautious influence of Housing Administrator Raymond Foley was too great for the Congressmen to counteract.

In the months since then, veterans',

labor and consumer groups have continued to plug for middle-income housing; members of the Senate Housing Subcommittee have learned from their summer tour of Sweden and other cooperative-minded countries that such programs are feasible, and economic indicators have shown the President the need for a major stimulant such as a middle-income housing program would provide.

THE SEC DIVIDED

The Securities and Exchange Commission is seriously divided in its approval to Congress on the question of revisions in the Securities and Exchange Act.

When New Dealer Ganson Purcell was still chairman in 1946, the SEC asked Congress to eliminate a double standard with respect to the protection of investors by extending its supervision over corporations whose securities are not formally listed on regulated exchanges. Last week the Commission presented a convincing list of reasons for prompt regulation of the \$19 billion of outstanding securities involved. The new study revealed that there are 1,118 companies, with at least \$3 billion in assets, and 300 or more security holders each, which are not now required to file reports with the SEC or furnish complete information to their stockholders. The report showed that "there was a general failure to disclose important non-financial information. None of the companies made any mention of material transactions between the company and its management, and there was little discussion of impending developments which might affect the company or the industry."

The six largest corporations not now under SEC regulation include: Humble Oil & Refining Company, with assets of \$861 million and 11,617 stockholders; Creole Petroleum Corporation, assets of \$618 million

and 4,600 stockholders; Aluminum Company of America, assets of \$503 million and more than 12,000 stockholders; the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, assets of \$322 million; Weyerhaeuser Timber Company, assets of \$210 million; and Singer Manufacturing Company, assets of \$202 million. Senator J. Allen Frear (D, Del.) has introduced a bill to amend the Securities and Exchange Act to take in these unlisted corporations.

Moving in the opposite direction, the new Republican chairman of the SEC, Harry A. McDonald, recently held a meeting with representatives of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and the Investment Bankers Association to work out a plan that would make it easier for underwriters to sell securities without giving full information to the buyer beforehand. McDonald hopes to get his plan before Congress in legislative form during this session. Opposition already has been expressed, however, by Commissioners Edward McCormick and Richard McEntire.

STREAMLINING CONGRESS

A second-round effort to modernize the Congressional branch of the government is under way. Robert Heller, chairman of the National Committee for Strengthening Congress, whose report issued in 1944 set the pattern for the reorganization of Congress under the LaFollette-Monroney Act two years later, has released a critical analysis of the interworkings of Congress with more suggestions for improvement.

High on Heller's list is revision of the Senate's antique code of rules that allow "unlimited and irrelevant debate" and the "large-scale absenteeism" of Senators—practices which exasperate many of the members themselves. The old 1917 closure rule proved ineffectual (it was applied only four times in 32 years). The new

closure rule, adopted last March, was "a retrogressive step," since it requires the approval of 64 Senators in order to close debate, compared with two-thirds of those present under the old rule (which actually might be as few as 33).

"The new procedure so stiffens the voting requirements that we anticipate that it will be harder hereafter—rather than easier—to limit debate when it is designed not to instruct or persuade, but to prevent action," the Heller report said. The committee urged the Senate to reconsider and liberalize its rules to enable a majority of its members, or of those present, to limit debate on any motion, measure or other pending matter after there has been an adequate opportunity to debate fully.

Heller emphasized that absenteeism has been growing worse each year. During the last session of Congress, more than 250 leaves of absence were granted Senators. "Such large-scale absenteeism is bound to affect the fate of legislation and to slow down the legislative process." The committee recommended that the Senate be less lenient in permitting absences, and enforce the law which provides that

a member's pay shall be docked every day he is absent without leave except on account of illness.

The Southern Democrat-Republican coalition inspired another of the committee's recommendations: to increase use of the caucus to ensure party responsibility. "It is the only known means by which the parties may formulate their legislative policies and by which the majority party can bind its members and execute its decisions," Heller said. He urged that committee chairmen who cannot meet the test of party regularity be deprived of their posts.

Additional streamlining recommendations include:

❶ Better control of expenditures by the Joint Budget Committee. Heller again urged a reasonable trial of the legislative budget procedure virtually ignored by Congress during the past three years.

❷ Reduction of the work load on Congress. The 1946 Reorganization Act imposed a partial ban upon the introduction of private bills, but so many "loopholes" were left that "Congress is still bedeviled by floods of private claims which it cannot possibly handle on their merits." Forty-four percent of all the bills passed by the first session of the 81st Congress were private bills, and Heller—at the same time urging "home rule" for the District of Columbia—recommended that Congress "divest itself of its petty private and local business."

In his letter to Congressmen, Heller said: "The experience of the last three years indicates that the strengthening of Congress should be a continuous process, and that much remains to be done to increase its efficiency."

OUTSIDE AMERICA

By tradition, Spain's "most Catholic" kings have had for centuries the privilege of giving Popes the golden hammer for the symbolic opening of the Jubilee Door of St. Peter's Basilica at the start of Holy Years. This year the privilege fell to Generalissimo Francisco Franco.

The Spanish dictator also gave the Pope a rather less symbolic gift. In his role as guide and mentor of Latin America's like-spirited dictators, and also in his new self-assumed position as Protector of Islam, he was able to round up enough votes in the UN General Assembly to enable the Vatican to achieve its goal of internationalizing Jerusalem.

Whether Jerusalem ever really is internationalized remains to be seen; but what is already clear is that its fate is part of a new phase in the eternal power-politics duel for oil and war bases in the Near East. In this phase, the Near East reveals the rather remarkable new geographical contours of Europe, America and the Atlantic Ocean as they are being redrawn by the military strategists of the Pentagon and the Fourth-Pointers of the State Department. Jerusalem, in addition to being a suburb of Lake Success, is linked with Washington, Vatican City, Madrid and also Cairo. Egypt is now part of Europe—so King Farouk's Premier Hussein Siri Pasha has officially announced. Not only are the Mediterranean and the Red Sea parts of the Atlantic; so are the Dead Sea and the Persian Gulf—this is the official view of Iraq's new Premier Sayed Ali Jawdet Ayubi, an ardent pro-American Fourth-Pointer, and of his Vice-Premier, Sayed Muzahim el Pashashi, an equally ardent pro-Egyptian Arab-Leaguer.

The present phase of the old deal



in the Near East throws some light on the victory of the Harriman-Bruce-Bohlen-Snyder-Hoffman combination in Washington over the Kennan faction. For the British have been forced to yield to the Americans; the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office have paid the bill (or part of it) for the concessions which Sir Stafford Cripps obtained at the Washington economic conferences last autumn. The "disappearance" of Syria's Colonel Zaym



marked the end of British Fifth-Columnism in the Near East, the start of the success of American Fourth-Pointism. The Hashemite

Premier Nuri Pasha Said of Iraq, British agent, departed without waiting for military gunmen to visit him.

Now Egypt's Farouk, America's "chosen instrument," is top dog, and Britain's favorite godson, the Hashemite King Abdullah of Jordan, very much the underdog. And by an ironic twist, the Israelis not only are moving toward common action with Abdullah on the fate of Jerusalem, but are turning toward London for protection against an American policy which, they fear, may threaten the very existence of their new state. Moreover, the Arab League, which was founded by the British, has now become Farouk's tool against the British scheme of creating a Hashemite "Greater Syria" or "Fertile Crescent." And the Vatican Secretariat of State, whose basic political aim in Europe is a coalition of clerical-Christian Western European states without England, is working out through Franco a new Catholic-Moslem political *modus vivendi*.

When the Arab League began its last conference in Cairo in November, Iraq's Nuri Pasha expected to be able to win over the Syrians to a fusion with Iraq that might form the basis for realizing the British project of the "Fertile Crescent." But American influence whipped up republican sentiment in Syria against the idea of making Abdullah king of "Greater Syria." At the same time Egyptian influence

aggravated the quarrel between Syrian monarchists who favored Abdullah and others who wanted his nephew, the Regent of Iraq, or the little King Faisal II.

It was at this point that the Egyptians proposed a general military pact of security—a scheme largely worked out by American Ambassador Jefferson Caffery and the American Colonel Norman Fiske. At the instance of Lebanon's Fuad Bey Ammun, this was linked with a general economic pact—a proposal strongly favored by the Fourth-Pointers. The Lebanese hinted at great benefits from the United States by alluding to the recently concluded Lebanon-American treaty which calls for consultation "whenever the situation requires."

By the time the conference ended, the British pattern in the Near East was fast breaking up. Then the finishing blows were dealt by the conference of American Near Eastern diplomats in Ankara; it was widely rumored that the Americans would not only provide the wherewithal for the economic military pact, intended to build up the pro-Egyptian, pro-American form of the Arab League as the dominant force in the Near East, but would prevent the British from helping Jordan's Abdullah. And Israel would get no help at all. The fact that the American delegation at the United Nations Assembly, after having voted against the internationalization of Jerusalem, changed its mind (the British did not) and voted for funds to set up UN control, has been taken in the Near East as proof of Washington's "good intentions."

On the oil question, conferences were held in Washington last July among the heads of the American, British and Dutch industries. In a report submitted to ECA in September, it was assumed that the Haifa refinery would start working again in 1950, that the American-Arabian pipeline would begin operating in 1952, the Anglo-Iranian also in 1952, the Iraq-Petroleum in 1953. By this schedule the huge American production from the Saudi Arabian fields will begin

reaching the Mediterranean well before the British production of the Iranian fields. Until recently the British policy has been to keep the area in such a state of disturbance that the American plans could not be worked out.

On the side of military security, the scheme of Marshal Montgomery foresaw a supporting chain of air-ground bases behind the front lines against the Soviets—stretching from the Persian Gulf to Malta.

On the large question of economic development, the most important plan was the Lowdermilk project, a kind of Jordan Valley Authority that called for the diversion of a part of the waters of the Jordan River to raise the level of the Dead Sea by Mediterranean water and at the same time to generate electric power.

In all these matters, the British attitude was pretty much the Kennan one—the notion that everything could be taken care of by direct (and exclusive) Anglo-American coöperation. But the pro-European faction in the State Department interpreted the British conduct in the Near East, rather than London's diplomatic proposals, as the determining factor; and apparently has succeeded in bringing American policy to a scheme for coöperation with Egypt and with the kind of Western Europe for which the Vatican Secretariat of State stands.

But many things remain to be decided in the Near East—whether the fumes of oil politics, far stronger than any odor of sanctity in the Holy Places of Jerusalem, are ignited to set off a new blaze of armed conflict; whether the victims of British policy and Hashemite and Senussi pogromism are better off with the Arab-Leaguers of the Farouk dispensation; whether the Near East's millions of moneyless, homeless, landless peasants and workers will be better off under the American capitalists than under the effendis; whether the edifice of security against Communism will be stronger in a Near East in which Harry Truman shares with Francisco Franco the role of Protector of Islam. PERCY WINNER

TRUMAN ECONOMICS—1950 MODEL

CONFIDENCE, mutual understanding and continued growth characterize the new economic philosophy of the Truman Administration. In his Economic Report to Congress, the President spoke of "effective teamwork between free enterprise and government" toward the goal of "maximum employment" in 1950 and an annual output in excess of \$300 billion within five years. A week earlier, his Council of Economic Advisers, in its Fourth Annual Report, entitled "Business and Government," buried the doctrine of secular stagnation, emphasized reliance on free enterprise rather than "compensatory" action by government, and made the meaningful, though perplexing, statement that purchasing power generated by deficit financing, while "better than no purchasing power at all, would not have equivalent economic value to purchasing power generated by production efforts."

In both reports, businessmen receive pats on the back for aid in reversing the "1949 recession." The President, for instance, remarked that "businessmen, workers, and farmers demonstrated much greater judgment and restraint than in earlier periods." Consideration is given below to the notion that economic education is a principal means of continued prosperity, because that seems to have become the Council's theme song.

The President and his Council paint a rosy picture of the present and prospective state of our economy. The 1949 downturn was mainly the result of inventory liquidation. Intelligent action in industry, continued consumer expenditures, and a shift from a federal cash surplus of some \$8 billion in 1948 to a deficit of about \$1.7 billion in 1949 turned the tide. Since last July, non-agricultural employment has increased about two million, the wholesale-price level has been practically stable, and the liquid position of business corporations has improved with a reduction in their short-term debt and inventories. Construction and consumer disposable income are at an all-time high. So optimistic is the outlook that stock prices have risen about 25 percent since June.

A few unfavorable elements cause the Council to be rather guarded in stating the "bases for confidence

by **Richard A. Lester**

as 1950 opens." Personal savings rose to 7.5 percent of disposable income

in 1949 compared with three percent in 1947 and 6.3 percent in 1948. Consumer installment credit reached an all-time peak of \$11 billion by the first of this year, which is double either the prewar figure or the average for 1947. Our surplus of exports over imports shrank rapidly during 1949, the figure for the last quarter in 1949 being less than one-third the quarterly average for 1947. Business investment in plant and equipment continued to decline throughout 1949, and surveys indicate a further drop in the first quarter of 1950.

Few of the recommendations of the President or the Council arise directly from any threats to economic stability that they find from their study of current conditions and trends. True, the President does urge restoration of the Federal Reserve Board's authority to regulate consumer credit. To aid business investment, both Truman and the Council propose unspecified revisions in the tax structure to stimulate business expansion and also legislation to place the credit of the federal government behind loans to coöperatives and non-profit organizations for the construction of housing for "middle-income families." The remainder of the program consists principally of support for the Brannan farm plan and for measures that the President has repeatedly recommended—expanded and liberalized social security, federal aid to education, an approval of the St. Lawrence and Columbia River projects, the Charter for the International Trade Organization, and the Point Four Program.

With the broad objectives of the Fair Deal any good liberal would agree, although probably in most cases primarily for reasons other than economic stability in the narrow sense of business-cycle elimination at high levels of employment. The Council, for example, adds little in support of a sound social-security program, and, while most of its remarks are well taken, some ambiguous sentences in its Annual Report (p. 23) are a bit confusing. The Council's criticism of farm price-support legislation, on the grounds that it is inadequate for the complex task of combining expansion in some crops with contraction in others (such as cotton and wheat), goes to the center of our agricultural problem. As Professor Theodore W. Schultz points out in *Production and Welfare of Agriculture* (1949), a new agricultural program is needed that will allow price adjustments to facilitate the best use of our agricultural

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resources. Price supports stimulate surpluses, involve expensive storage costs and give rise to export dumping and restrictive commodity agreements, both of which threaten a liberal foreign-trade policy. In addition, the largest government payments are being made to the farms earning the highest incomes. Government interference in agricultural markets on the basis of price relationships some 40 years ago prevents proper land use and satisfactory income distribution.

To students of business cycles, the Council's references to its "improved economic analysis" will probably be the most disturbing element in its Fourth Annual Report and its Annual Economic Review. The Council correctly stresses economic balance, but unfortunately fails to explain what wage-price-profit relationships and what distribution of the total product among businessmen, workers, and farmers is "most conducive to economic stability and growth." The answer, the Council insists, "resides in the process of study and education" and in "improved economic understanding."

Those who have carefully investigated the problem, like Professor J. M. Clark, find it practically impossible to specify, except within limits and with various qualifications, the desirable balance between prices and costs. If the Council has developed reliable standards of judgment in this area, it is certainly one of Washington's best-kept secrets. Yet, without supporting data or explanation, the Council pronounces some prices too high, while at the same time placing great reliance for future economic stability on its own ability, through meetings with management, labor, and others, to induce them to act as the Council desires, even when such action may be against short-run private interests. Isn't the Council a bit naïve in assuming that its unrevealed "improved analysis" has exerted, or will exert, significant influence upon decision-making by business management and labor unions? Certainly its exhortations to business and labor to be moderate during the postwar price rise were practically ignored.

The weaknesses of the Council's program of stability by hortatory and educational means is perhaps best revealed in connection with its new general wage principle. In contrast to the notion that improvements in productivity should result in a declining level of prices, the Council offers as a "general wage principle" that the level of money wages rises with the rate of increase in productivity, so that the price level will remain reasonably stable. That principle is sound not only for reasons generally offered but because it has beneficial effects on worker attitudes and facilitates in-plant adjustments to improved techniques.

But is labor in this country so organized and conditioned that unions will accept, year after year, an increase in wages (including fringe benefits) limited to two to 2.5 percent annually, which has been the increase in productivity per worker during past decades? What prescription does the Council have to offer to overcome the alleged inflationary bias in our present organizational arrangements? Only more education and free advice. To quote the Council, "Increasing study of what constitutes sound wage policy should bring larger conformity to it, because basically both management and labor are propelled by the desire to pursue a reasonable course." Two or 2.5 percent a year may be sound national economics, but how does the Council make it seem like sound politics to John L. Lewis, Phil Murray or Walter Reuther?

The confidence of the public in the Council is not enhanced by emphasis on its own "confidence" and the statement that a cumulative downturn can be avoided by convincing businessmen in sufficient numbers to "act in a manner consistent with the proposition that the long-range trend of the economy is upward." One is reminded of Hoover's pronouncements between 1929 and 1933. Unfortunately, the Council's record for predicting developments has not been such as to warrant too much public confidence. To go no further back than last year, the Economic Report of the President and statements by present Council members wrongly stressed the danger of inflation early in 1949.

The Council correctly perceives that "fluctuations in business investment have in the past been very marked and are breeders of instability elsewhere." It expresses deep concern that private domestic investment bunched up to a higher percentage of the gross national product in 1948 than in the boom year of 1929. It insists that investment must be continued at a fairly steady rate and that "housing production should be stabilized at very high levels." But how are we to prevent the postwar bunching up from having wavelike effects on replacement demand? How is the 17-year building cycle to be abolished after we make up for war and prewar deficiencies?

A growing market economy, as David McCord Wright well explains in *The Economics of Disturbance* (1947), is almost bound to distort itself, to suffer from disproportionate expansion of the durable-goods industries at rates faster than can be maintained. Especially in postwar years is there a basic conflict between speed in the satisfaction of pent-up demands and continued stability. It is not enough to preach individual enlightenment and benign economics if periodic over-expansion of the capital-goods industries is prac-

tically inherent in a capitalistic economy geared to satisfy changes in demand promptly. The Council has not faced up to this problem. Certainly much stronger medicine is needed than "confidence," bull sessions and the Administration's housing programs.

Confronted by a rather appalling job, the Council seems to place insufficient emphasis on the monetary, tax and expenditure policies of the federal government as stabilizing devices. By confining its thinking to normal procedures and customary ways of spending money (rather than considering more flexible but unconventional means such as changing tax burdens with economic conditions or possibly consumer subsidies or per-capita bonuses), the Council has tended to restrict its horizon and its arsenal of weapons for overcoming

instability. The result is too great reliance on its own gratuitous advice to the public, on automatic occurrence of budget deficits with slumps, and on good luck. Will those be sufficient to forestall the birth of a big wave in the durable-goods industries or to flatten it out when it really begins to roll?

The first chairman of the Council, Dr. Edwin G. Nourse, also strongly believed that businessmen and others could be persuaded to follow enlightened policies under Council guidance. Upon resigning last October, however, Nourse complained that the major economic groups in the economy continued to act in their own selfish interests. One cannot help but wonder who has the most to learn—leaders in industry and labor or members of the Council.

FREE LABOR'S OPPORTUNITY

THE International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, which came into

by **Charles Ronsac**

being last November in London, will certainly count in the social history of our time. But it will be important only if it overcomes the combined effects of apathy and the fanaticism of that other "iron curtain" which already has prevented many people from learning about the new organization, its aims, and its significance.

Four years ago, also in London, the World Federation of Trade Unions was born out of the enthusiasm aroused by the Yalta and Potsdam agreements between the British and Russian councils of trade unions. The events of the last four years have shown why the WFTU never realized its hopes of coöperation between free unions, able to influence government policies, and unions that could only obey government orders.

To Europeans, the most spectacular feature of the London conference that created the new confederation was what might be called the bipartisan policy of American labor. For the first time the AFL and the CIO acted jointly to help establish a political organization.

Also of great importance in the new International is the special position of the British Trades Union Council. With its 12 million members, it represents the second force in the ICFTU, a second which is trying to play the role of a "third force" between American labor and the smaller federations of continental Western Europe. If we add the 12 million British trade unionists to the 16 million American union members, we find that the labor forces of these two

nations outnumber those workers from the 45 other countries that have

affiliated with the ICFTU.

In Western Germany and in the Benelux and Scandinavian countries the majority of the millions of organized workers are in non-Communist unions. In Scandinavia these unions, somewhat as in Britain, are close to their governments. In Belgium, where the Socialist Party has never held power entirely by itself, the unions have always preserved their independence of the government, even when Paul-Henri Spaak headed the coalition. In Western Germany, where the Communists are a small minority, the unions remain independent of the Social Democratic Party. An example of their independence was the stand taken at the London meetings by Hans Boeckler, president of the Western German Federation of Labor, on the question of control of the Ruhr industries. Contrary to the West German Social Democrats' opposition to any Allied control of the Ruhr, Boeckler asserted that German labor understood the need of Germany's neighbors for security. He went further, however, and argued that labor should participate in the exploitation of the Ruhr and promote similar control of the key industries of the whole Continent.

In other countries the non-Communist unions are not so healthy. In Latin America—especially in Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic—the majority of the workers continue to follow Lombardo Toledano's Latin American Federation of Labor, affiliated with the WFTU. Promise is seen, however, in the recently organized inter-American Confederation of Workers, affiliated with the ICFTU.

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In Asia—omitting the newly independent India and Indonesia—most of the unions remain affiliated with the WFTU and, as a consequence of the Communist victory in China, are likely to extend their influence.

Although the majority of the members are not Communists themselves, the unions of French North Africa are likewise Communist-dominated.

The Palestinian Federation of Labor is still in the WFTU but is expected to swing over to the new organization.

The two countries of Western Europe where the Communists are strongest in the labor unions are, of course, France and Italy. There the overwhelming majority of workers are still in the CGT, whose leaders are openly members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Only a divided minority of Italian and French workers were represented at London.

In the fight between the ICFTU and the WFTU over the souls of the workers throughout the world, it would appear that the WFTU has the advantage, since its real headquarters is in the Kremlin and it has at its disposal all the power of the Cominform. But this power may contain the germ of ultimate weakness, provided the new confederation employs the right weapons in the fight. For, luckily, the WFTU will surely make the mistake of putting Wall Street, the State Department, Chiang Kai-shek, Franco, the British Labour Party, colonialism—and the new labor organization—in the same "imperialist" bag.

For its part, the ICFTU could make the mistake of allowing itself to become an American instrument of opposition to the Russian-dominated federation. It is the responsibility of American labor to see that this does not happen.

The new free confederation begins under the disadvantage that it cannot be heard by the workers in the Russian area and yet has to convince workers elsewhere who still have reason to follow the Communist demagoguery. Slogans about freedom and democracy will not be sufficient to overcome this handicap. They must be supported by economic and social achievements.

An example is the situation in Latin America. The ICFTU strongly denounced the Latin American dictatorships and offered to help the victims recover their freedom. The fact that some of the Latin American regimes remain in power only through the financial support of big American corporations is exploited by the Toledano branch of the WFTU, which does not hesitate to accuse the US State Department of being an accomplice of the corporations. It is up to American labor to fight the Latin American dictators by fighting their capitalist allies in the United States.

In Asia the situation is even more difficult. In Nehru's India, misery reigns, strikers are prosecuted and labor leaders—Communist and non-Communist—are imprisoned. Forced labor still exists for the benefit of a privileged minority. Fortunately, India's two big federations, the Indian National Trade Unions Congress and the Hind Mazdor Sabha, both adhering to the ICFTU, are free to oppose government policy.

The fight for social security in Indo-China, Malaya, Burma and Ceylon is closely tied in to the struggle for national independence. The ICFTU has adopted a resolution supporting the dependent peoples in their right to "determine or change their political, economic and social institutions through democratic means." The resolution is not quite realistic; in the countries concerned, the workers' problem is first to get the democratic means by which they can fight for changes in their political, social and economic conditions. If the ICFTU does not actively support independence in such countries its own cause will be lost and the Communists will gain.

The future of the ICFTU will also be difficult in Italy, where speeches about freedom do not impress unemployed workers and barefoot peasants, who ask only for freedom from hunger and misery.

In France the Force Ouvrière has suffered from its relations with the French Socialist Party and has been held co-responsible for the government's policy of freezing wages while allowing prices to rise. It may be possible to merge the Force Ouvrière and all the autonomous unions under a new common leadership and then bring in at least the left wing of the French Christian Confederation. In any case, it will be hard to attract the millions in the Communist-dominated CGT without a dynamic change of program.

This tour d'horizon gives only a general idea of the difficulties confronting the ICFTU. The difficulties are great, but perhaps the hopes are greater. One of them lies in the prospect of European economic coöperation. Thanks to the new federation, European free labor is much more united than are European states and economies, despite the obvious differences between the unions. As a result, the unions are in a position to demand that they be allowed to participate in organizations like the Council of Europe and OEEC—not just as adjuncts of their governments defending national interests, but as a European body promoting progressive European solutions to European problems. If they are united in action, the European federations of labor can first of all put forward realistic proposals for planning and integrating industrial production, workers' wages and social legislation throughout Western

Europe. If this is not done, "regional" measures in regard to trade and money will simply mean greater competition for the benefit of the most reactionary nations. By taking a stand for coöperation and at the same time claiming full participation in production management and goods distribution, European unions

will not only overrun their Communist competitors but will also pave the way for an integrated Europe that may not be quite what certain industrial and financial cartels have in mind. With the help of American labor, this might mean for European unions, and for the advance of democracy, a historic opportunity.

BRITAIN'S FOREIGN POLICY

SINCE THE SUMMER of 1945, the Labour Party has had an unchallengeable majority in the British House of Commons. It has been able to vote down the persistent and sometimes bitter opposition of the Tories on domestic affairs. But time and again, on issues of foreign policy, Labour and Conservative MPs have gone into the same lobby to sustain Foreign Secretary Bevin against his critics on the Left. This is not surprising, for whatever the differences between the two parties on home policy, for all these years Britain has had an essentially bipartisan foreign policy. The division is not between the Labour Government and the Tories but between the bipartisan majority and a small group on the Left which regards the bipartisan policy as a betrayal of Socialism. As Anglo-Soviet relations have deteriorated, so this group of critics has become smaller and more isolated, and some of its members—notably Konni Zilliacus—have been expelled from the Labour Party.

It also follows from this bipartisan agreement that foreign policy will not be an issue at the General Election. Even in 1945, foreign affairs did not play much part in the election campaign. It is true that the Labour Party claimed that it could, being Socialist, more easily reach a postwar understanding with the USSR than could the Tories. But that claim soon became quite irrelevant; Ernest Bevin and his Cabinet colleagues accepted the idea of "continuity" in foreign policy. In any case, foreign issues make poor campaign material in Britain.

This bipartisan policy, however, is limited in scope. It applies only to Britain's attitude toward the Soviet Union and Communism. For it is on this that Labour and the Tories most agree. Both parties accept the "tough" policy toward Russia. And both, therefore, have supported the Greek government against the Communists, backed de Gasperi in Italy, the Center coalitions in France and, more recently, the conserva-

by **Norman MacKenzie**

tive Bonn regime. Both parties welcomed the Marshall Plan, endorsed the Atlantic Pact and have voted the large arms budget required to sustain Britain's rearmament and overseas military commitments. On all this, Labour and the Tories have differed only in emphasis, not in principle.

Although this policy defines Britain's position on the greatest and most pressing problem in foreign affairs—the rift between the Communist and non-Communist blocs—it leaves several vital questions unanswered. What, for instance, should be Britain's attitude toward proposals for European union? Or toward the Commonwealth and the sterling area? Or toward the United States? On such matters, there is not the same agreement between the parties, or even within the parties. Some Labour MPs go along with Churchill on the European union. Some Tory MPs strongly oppose it and applaud the Labour Government's anxiety about the future of the Commonwealth and the Empire.

Meanwhile, both the Tories and the Labour Party are reluctant to make hard-and-fast decisions. When Churchill was asked whether he favored an orientation toward Europe, toward the Commonwealth or toward the USA, he replied that he saw no reason to think that any one of these should exclude the others. "We can pursue them all, simultaneously," he said, winning a burst of applause from his Tory audience. The Labour Government takes much the same view, nodding agreeably in all three directions as occasion demands.

There are, of course, political groups which believe that Britain must choose among European union, Atlantic union, and an independent position in collaboration with the Dominions and the Empire. Each group is convinced that its own nostrum is the only way out for Britain, and that it must be accepted before bankruptcy and collapse overtake the British economy. It is tempting to consider such dramatic solutions. But there are also good reasons for hesitating about them.

Britain's world position is unique. Though it has strong economic and political links with Europe, it is also the center of an imperial system of autonomous

This is the fourth and last in the series of articles on the outstanding issues in the campaign preceding the British election, which is now set for February 23. The author is a member of the staff of the New Statesman and Nation (London).

dominions and dependent colonies strung around the globe. For these, and for a few associated nations, it acts as banker and also, politically, as the first among equals. To the Commonwealth and the sterling area, as Sir Stafford Cripps recently reminded ECA chief Paul G. Hoffman when he was chided for Britain's coolness toward European "integration," Britain has special and paramount responsibilities which cannot be laid aside. Nor can they be greatly modified without serious difficulty. For the sterling area is still the largest area of unrestricted multilateral trade in the world and its disintegration would have enormous and unforeseeable implications.

Before the war, Britain's multilateral trade kept Europe supplied with dollars. Britain (with its economic dependencies) had a dollar surplus, but, buying more from Europe than Europe bought from Britain, pumped many of those dollars into the Continent. Today, both Britain and Europe have dollar deficits.

Now should Britain try to rebuild that old relationship? Or should it "integrate" with Europe, pooling both dollar deficits and dollar earnings, and making a joint effort to stabilize the European economy as a whole? This is a vital question. In any case, the British of both parties ask, what does "integration" really mean? Hoffman's explanation in November, they feel, did little to enlighten them. If it means convertibility of currencies and unrestricted trade, Britain accepts those as desirable long-run objectives. If it means rationalization of European industry, to make the industrial production of each country complementary rather than wastefully competitive, that, too, is laudable. If, in the political sphere, it means a progressive elimination of the more obsolete and stupid elements of national sovereignty, that, also, is acceptable as an objective. But none of these things can be done quickly. They certainly cannot be done in time to make any radical improvement in Europe's position before 1952. And, in the meantime, Britain has to live, and to carry its overseas responsibilities. This, both Tories and Labourites feel, is not "British isolationism," but realism.

The question of speed is crucial. The British argue that Hoffman—and the Congress he has to mollify—are expecting Europe, including Britain, to compress into a few years a process which took more than two generations in the United States, where conditions were more favorable to it. The historical, political and technical obstacles to real European union are immense, and it does nobody any good to underestimate them.

It is such considerations that account for British hesitation. True, if the nations of Western Europe are too cautious, there may be precious little left to unite in a

few years' time. Unity is dictated by the desire to survive, economically and, if need be, militarily, as much as by idealistic concepts of federation.

There are, however, alternatives to "integration" which are being canvassed in Britain. The first is the perennial imperial dream of Lord Beaverbrook and a diehard section of the Tories, who believe that Britain should hold aloof from Europe and concentrate instead upon intensive development of the Empire in collaboration with the Dominions. This policy, presented as a panacea, seems as fruitless as it ever did. The second is an attempt by Britain to establish a special position vis-à-vis the United States, short of union but something more than ordinary collaboration. This policy recognizes the obstacles to British "integration" in Europe and the need for holding the sterling area together. At the same time, it assumes that Britain cannot hope to reestablish its prewar position. Therefore, the argument runs, the next best thing is for Britain to become a junior partner to the US, retaining a degree of independence through the assets of the Empire and acting as an intermediary between the US and Europe.

Both these policies, obviously, assume that the cold war will continue and that Britain will still have to carry a crushing burden of defense spending. So long as Britain feels it necessary to be prepared against war with the USSR, there can be little relief, though armaments this year cost almost as much as the social services—that is, about 30 percent of the budget and nearly 10 percent of the gross national income. These policies assume, moreover, that Britain cannot greatly expand its trade with the Communist bloc. If the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were willing and able to buy and sell on a large scale, and if the British reciprocated, much of Britain's trade problem would be overcome. A different orientation might then be conceivable. The same is true of Europe, as the reports of the Economic Commission for Europe have suggested. But so long as Western Europe feels threatened, neither a reduction in arms spending nor an increase in trade is likely. Both would seem to strike at the security of Western Europe.

What, then, will be the policy of the next British government, whichever party wins the election? It is unlikely to change much in fundamentals. It is probable that Britain will encourage and approve any advances toward European integration, but will not be willing to make precise commitments for its own part. It will try to maintain its ties with Europe, the Commonwealth and the New World, benefiting as much as possible from each and balancing each against the others. There would be little new in this. It is the traditional British policy.

HAROLD L. ICKES: *Truman's Formosa Policy*

PRESIDENT TRUMAN was more than right when he set American warmongers back on their heels by making it known that there would be no fishing by the United States in the turgid waters of Formosa. He must have seen that the course proposed by bumbling former President Hoover, with the support of the usually level-headed and high-minded statesman, Senator Robert A. Taft, would be taking a step in the direction of a third devastating world war.

Mr. Hoover's maladroitness in the Far East when he was President should have caused him to hesitate to instruct a far wiser statesman what to do. Mr. Hoover had as his Secretary of State one of the great men who have served in that office. It was Henry L. Stimson who pointed out to the inexperienced and vacillating man in the White House, who can be so assertive when he has no public responsibility, how high a price Great Britain and the United States would have to pay if they remained indifferent to the aggressions of the Japanese against China. It was clear to Mr. Stimson, if not to his chief, that it was the purpose of the Japanese to subjugate the vast area of China.

If President Hoover and the appeasing government of Great Britain had called a halt to Japan's brutal and unholy encroachment they would not only have saved China, which was then far from being Communist; they would probably have prevented World War II. But Mr. Hoover, who is so voluble with his free advice, which may or may not be worth all that it has cost us, could not be persuaded to do what could easily have been done at that time. Lately, he has been letting out war whoops and demanding that a more vigilant and more far-sighted President send the US Navy to Formosa. Unless he deliberately wants to see his country involved in war, he should realize that such an insane venture would be too late by the length of time that lies between Mr. Hoover's do-nothing administration and Mr. Truman's affirmative action.

Mr. Hoover's genuflections in the direction of the God of War, surprising as they are, are not so disturbing as the position of such men as Senator Taft, of Ohio, and Senator Smith, of New Jersey. The equivocal position of Senator Vandenberg is also a cause for concern. These three outstanding members of the US Senate—and other lesser members of that body—appear to have lost their sense of direction. They should realize that we cannot associate ourselves again with Chiang Kai-shek and his corrupt gang, either on the island of Formosa or anywhere else. Even if Chiang

had any just claim to Formosa, he has forfeited it by the inhuman treatment of the Formosans by his Nationalist troops. One of the most ruthless massacres in history occurred recently in Formosa when Chiang's murderous soldiers indiscriminately cut down civilian men, women and children by the thousands.

Today the Chinese bully sits astride Formosa like a veritable old man of the sea. The Formosans, who are not Chinese and who were not at war with Chiang, justifiably hate him with a deep hatred. If we had gone to Chiang's aid, that hatred would have included us, too—if it had not in fact been centered upon us, as even more unjustifiably interlopers in a land that has a right to expect sympathetic understanding from us. If Chiang cannot maintain himself in Formosa, we could not do it for him without recklessly using our full strength, which we have no right to do against a people that has never done us any harm. It is not improbable that the Formosan people, who have already suffered unendurably at the hands of Chiang, will rise against him in the hope of being able to drive him and his fellow criminals into the sea. Even lacking intervention on our part, it may be that the arms with which Chiang's soldiers have cut down the natives of Formosa were supplied by our own government with no even remote idea that they would be used for the purpose to which Chiang has put them. There is irony in the reflection that Chiang may even be using American munitions against American ships peaceably plying their trade, outside the harbor of Shanghai. In so doing, Chiang is more robber baron than mendicant.

Mr. Truman has done well in trying to set Mr. Hoover and his fellow warmongers right. Americans who have had enough of war and who want our efforts devoted to peace will approve the statesmanlike attitude of their President. But he has another duty to perform. Only he, as Commander-in-Chief, can put General MacArthur in his place. This arrogant and presumptuous brass-hat should be told that the conduct of foreign affairs is exclusively that of the President. He should be made to realize, sternly if necessary, that what he sees in his shaving mirror every morning is not the reflection of God Almighty. He should be brought to strict account for his disloyalties to his superiors. Particularly he should be required, without loss of time, to explain how a confidential communication from the State Department leaked to the press in Tokyo.

HAROLD L. ICKES

BOOKS IN REVIEW

GENETICS FOR A MONO-CULTURE

THE LATEST TURN in the Lysenko affair has already called forth a spate of articles in the West, both in the lay and the scientific press. Now the books are beginning to appear. It is fortunate that one of the first has been written by a man exceptionally well qualified to assess the many factors involved in this complex situation.

HEREDITY EAST AND WEST: LYSENKO AND WORLD SCIENCE, by Julian Huxley (Henry Schuman; \$3).

Julian Huxley is not only a geneticist of worldwide reputation, but has had, as the first Director General of UNESCO, a profound experience of scientific administration on the international level. His previous writings have shown him to be neither an uncritical worshiper of all things Soviet nor an uncompromising enemy of the revolution; he is rather one of the intellectual representatives of that massive body of progressive but non-Marxist opinion in which lies the only hope of amicable relations between Russia and the English-speaking countries.

Huxley finds little or no common ground between us and the Soviets in connection with Lysenko. As has been mentioned, the affair is complex. It must be discussed from at least five different points of view: those of science, scientific administration, philosophy, economic planning and general sociological engineering. Confronted with this jungle of overlapping considerations, most of which are expressed in terms of concepts whose definition is, to say the least, not precise, the scientist will make a beeline for his one incontrovertible touchstone, the experimental facts. He finds very little. The Lysenko school claims that Soviet agricultural practice uses many varieties of crops and animals which owe their origin to the opera-

by C. H. Waddington

tion of the Lysenkoist principles of the inheritance of acquired characters, graft hybridization, and so on. But the technical literature contains few factual accounts of the actual experiments; and at the recent conference of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences devoted to the controversy, no one thought it worthwhile to describe any experiment in detail, although Lysenko himself devoted a few lines to one piece of work which had been performed several years ago.

Moreover, it is difficult to believe that good experimental data exist, although unpublished. Those experiments which have been described are so deficient in adequate controls, omit so many necessary precautions, and fail to exclude so many obvious explanations of a more conventional type, that they give one no confidence in the quality of the unpublished work. On the purely scientific level, therefore, the most favorably disposed critic could concede no more than that Lysenko may possibly have discovered some new facts, but if so, no convincing evidence for it has yet been made available. Further, there is no doubt that many of his allegedly new facts can actually find an easy explanation within the framework of modern genetics; while even his more unexpected results, if accepted, would not call for the total abandonment of genetics that he demands. Finally, the genetics that he rejects is, though he does not seem to realize it, the genetics of forty years ago, not that of today.

Huxley explains clearly and at length the reasons, just summarized, which have led the scientific world to conclude that Lysenko has little to contribute to the science of genetics. How is it then, one must ask, that he has been able to become a figure who

exerts such an important influence on the development of biology within the Soviet Union? Undoubtedly, the answers must be looked for in the other, not strictly scientific, implications of his position.

Of great, possibly of decisive, importance is the fact that he has attached himself and his doctrine to the economic and organizational developments which are being energetically pursued in Russia. For some reason obscure to the non-Russian eye, Lysenko genetics is held to be essentially connected with the current programs for the introduction of adequate measures of crop rotation, use of fertilizers, soil conservation and efficient animal husbandry. It is surely impossible to believe that the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party would be intellectually incapable of making a distinction, if it felt one to be necessary, between a theory of heredity and a practical program of improving agriculture. If it does not make such a distinction, it can only be because it does not think it desirable. In my opinion, the arguments which led the committee to this conclusion must have been derived from philosophical and sociological considerations.

Quite rightly, Huxley devotes the chapter immediately following his introductory account of the controversy to the ideological issue. His attitude to it, however, seems to confuse two issues which are at least partly distinct. He writes: "There is now a party line in genetics, which means that the basic scientific principle of the appeal to fact has been overridden by ideological considerations. . . . That is the major issue." And he continues, "In relation to this major issue, it is subsidiary whether or not Lysenko's claims to have made certain new discoveries are substantiated, and whether his theories are wholly or partly sound." But if his

theories are sound, then the party line does involve the appeal to fact. There are, therefore, two questions to discuss: is it reasonable to have such a thing as a party line in science; and is the present Russian party line correct?

There can be no doubt that the Russians believe in the possibility of defining a party line, and unless one understands the reasons which lead them to think so, any attempt to demonstrate that their line is wrong will seem to them prejudiced from the start. It is clear from the summary Huxley gives of the arguments which led up to the present position, that the Russian approach to the matter is extraordinarily *a priori* theoretical.

To the Western scientist, the quantity of philosophy which was talked by Lysenko and the other participants at the recent agricultural conference appears most remarkable. Much of it is at a surprisingly low intellectual level. As one example out of many, Dr. I. G. Glushchenko, of the Academy of Sciences' Institute of Genetics, first takes the orthodox genetical conclusion that the hereditary qualities of an animal are not altered by the conditions under which it developed, and interprets it, not as an empirical generalization applying, by and large, to animal life under reasonably normal conditions, but as the statement of a profound philosophical principle that such alterations are impossible; he then claims it as a weakness of his opponents that they have already themselves described certain phenomena which are inconsistent with the principle which he has just invented and fathered on to them; and, finally, he concludes that "the methodological faults of contemporary Morganism thus show how far removed this trend is from objective truth," apparently being so impressed by his own arguments as to whether a method ought to lead to the truth that he finds it unnecessary to refer to the experimental data to see whether or not they actually have done so.

Again, no intelligent man would argue like this unless there were some

strong urge which made it imperative for him to reach a certain conclusion, without bothering too much how he got there. So far as one can see, the lure that has seduced the Russians from the path of intellectual honesty and reliance on empirical evidence is the desire to build a society that is both progressive and mono-cultural. By "mono-cultural," I mean a society organized as a unity according to explicitly formulated principles. Such an ideal is in many ways a very attractive one. The non-Soviet societies of the world resound with expressions of dismay at their own lack of cultural integration and at their inability to bring about as rapid an advance in human welfare as would seem possible. There is an appeal on the grand scale in the conception of a society which is consciously seeking the advancement of every one of its mem-

bers, and in which productive enterprise, art, science and all the other activities of man are knit together into a harmonious whole by relations which are so clear and unambiguous that the simplest can recognize them. Huxley does not bring out the importance of this aspiration and thus underestimates the forces he is attacking. For it is, presumably, in the service of this ideal that the leaders of the Communist Party of Russia are prepared to give their support to a scientific doctrine which seems to fit smoothly into the general social and philosophical scheme.

But if one accepts the reality of the objective world—if one is a "materialist" in Lenin's sense—one cannot treat fact so cavalierly. The professional scientist's criticism, that Lysenko's theories are not convincing when tested against fact, remains valid

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in the face of any sociological and philosophical argumentation that can be advanced. And human life is more complicated than is convenient for builders of an integrated society. At any one time, man's creativeness is active on many different levels, in many different directions. The relations between art, science, production, morals and all the rest of his interests have never been simple; they have approached simplicity only in relatively static societies, such as that of feudal Catholicism. To build an integrated society is one of the most tremendous of man's tasks. The Russians are bold in facing it; but over Lysenko they have stumbled badly by being in too much of a hurry.

C. H. Waddington is professor of Animal Genetics at the University of Edinburgh and author of The Scientific Attitude and Introduction to Modern Genetics.

BRIEF COMMENT

The Twentieth Century, by Hans Kohn (Macmillan; \$2.50).

While this book, which consists of essays on the ideological background of totalitarianism, does not live up to its pretentious title, it is interesting and often illuminating. It is well in this hour of England's travail and decline to be reminded how much the Hindus and other Eastern peoples—not to mention some nearer home—owe the English, who, if they exploited them, also taught them to value political independence and individual liberty. For one reader at least, it is also of great interest to learn how deep and long-rooted among the Russians is the idea that the Slavs are possessed of a unique virtue which makes it necessary, and indeed inevitable, that they become the saviors—and rulers—of the world. Most important, the book calls attention to the recent disappearance in this country and elsewhere of the capacity for moral indignation. The most frightening and depressing aspect of the generally discouraging contemporary scene is that neither individual injustice nor mass holocausts seem able any more to arouse even a twinge of civic conscience.

Despite its virtues, *The Twentieth Century* is too fragmentary, its analyses too scattered and superficial, to be significant. For instance, to say that in Germany (as in Russia and Japan) the economic structure was tied much more closely to the government and political

organization than in the Western European countries does not seem a sufficient explanation of why light has come from England, but death and destruction from Germany.

It is perhaps a just commentary on our times that the concluding section, dealing with the forces of reintegration and reaffirmation, is the shortest, most superficial and least effective in the book.

THEODORE NORMAN

The Novel and Our Time, by Alex Comfort (Alan Swallow; \$1.50).

"The novel has now moved into a new social context" is the irrefutable thesis of Alex Comfort's short book. Speaking from his own experience as a practising novelist, he throws off a number of general (and often penetrating) ideas on many related topics, but unfortunately, except in a consideration of violence and sadism in contemporary fiction, the two terms of his title seldom connect.

The Cry and the Covenant, by Morton Thompson (Doubleday; \$3.50).

Ignaz Philipp Semmelweis was the nineteenth-century Hungarian doctor who discovered the cause of childbed fever. His findings were largely rejected during his lifetime and his career was a

tragic series of minor successes and disastrous setbacks. He died insane.

As a novel, this story of his life is a creditable work in the Scientist as Hero tradition. The characters are stock figures; the narrative runs its lively, if predictable, obstacle course, only occasionally bogged in oracular prose which serves to slow it to a more dignified pace. Interest derives wholly from the almost inevitable fascination of the subject of practical medicine which the author has skillfully prepared for the layman's consumption.

Story: The Fiction of the Forties. Edited by Whit Burnett and Hallie Burnett (E. P. Dutton; \$3.95).

This collection assembles fifty-one pieces published in *Story Magazine* during the last decade. The editors make a surprising claim to "a kind of premium on originality," eschewing stories of the "arty type" as well as "commercial pieces." In support of this claim, there are a number of skillful, readable stories of the kind the editors apparently admire; there are also several which are "arty" in the usual derogatory sense of the term, and if some of the pieces aren't "commercial," the bottom must have dropped out of the market.

J. F.

MOVIES: One-Man Band

DANNY KAYE can be defined as a juggler who does all his tricks with his face. He has developed mimicry, pantomime, grotesque mugging and double-talk patter into a sleight-of-hand act of bewitching dexterity. He is as exhausting to watch as six white mice in a cage, and his craft produces the same hysterical laughter that is induced by tickling the soles of the feet. I doubt that Kaye is wholesome entertainment, but he is a wonderfully exhilarating dissipation.

The current Kaye vehicle is a Technicolor slapstick version of Gogol's "The Inspector General," which is to say that it piles buffoonery on farce and offers no hindrance to its star's facial and vocal gymnastics. As the supposed imperial agent (Emperor Napoleon, in this instance, not Czar Nicholas) come to wreak gallows

justice on the corrupt bureaucrats of a town in the provinces, Kaye sings, dances and cavorts his way through 102 minutes of unpredictable and imitable nonsense. Henry Koster, the director, has wisely held everyone back (Walter Slezak, Elsa Lanchester, Gene Lockhart and Alan Hale head the supporting cast) to make room for the main event, and Kaye responds with a performance of grace, ingenuity and matchless showmanship. Warner Brothers deserves our thanks for at last letting Kaye put on the screen the kind of act that years ago made him the darling of the Catskills.

The Australian movie makers were establishing quite a reputation with "The Overlanders" and "Bush Christmas" (why wasn't the latter revived last month, by the way?) but now

they've spoiled it with "The Rugged O'Riordans." This tale of pioneer days in Australia looks like the Cain and Abel story as told by the father in *The Swiss Family Robinson*. It is stilted and pious, with ludicrous dialogue and preposterous acting. Some of the landscape is awe-inspiring, but the O'Riordans who try to fill it are as rugged as blanc mange.

The plot of "Dream No More," written and directed by Joseph Krumboltz for Palestine Films, is a happy one for a documentary intended to explain Israel to the world. It discusses the plight of an unheroic immigrant to that heroic land, shows his desperate efforts to justify his miraculous deliverance from Europe (he digs a posthole or bakes bread with the frenzied energy of a man under machine-gun fire) and explains in the process that Israel is a haven for a tormented people, not a Valhalla for warriors.

Avraham Doryon, the only professional in the cast, plays the pilgrim with touching diffidence and humor, and he is supported by the kind of sturdy competence that amateurs often bring to portrayals of themselves. But the picture is largely ruined by an abominable commentary that alternates between pompous boasting and embarrassing coyness. This overwritten, tasteless text is delivered by two voices, male and female, that sound like Bronxese prissily brushed up for a public-speaking contest. "Dream No More" was shot as a silent film, and as a silent film it would have been good enough. But then no commercial house would have shown it.

The new Russian picture, "Young Guard," deals with the melodramatic deeds of a group of boys and girls who engage in violent sabotage against a German garrison. It is a stirring oration on the infinite purity of the Communist soul, but it is sorry entertainment, sloppily constructed, badly photographed, as tiresomely noble as the scout oath.

Current Kremlin dogma is said to frown on the elevation of individuals

in works of fiction. In that case, the Russian film makers should avoid complicated tales of cops and robbers—

they become too confusing when everyone looks and acts alike.

ROBERT HATCH

ON THE AIR: Bedfellows

RADIO AND TELEVISION seem unable to decide whether they are man and wife engaged in a single family project or a pair of brothers trying to outsmart each other. The most important radio-television operations are conducted by the NBC, CBS and ABC networks, and when the internal competition gets really rough—perhaps three years from now, certainly not more than five—one of the media will almost certainly assert its supremacy. Since the greater investment will be in television, radio is more likely to be moved to the annex. But, since the majority of American set owners will still be wired only for

sound, the audience will be the loser. Now is the time, in my opinion, for the Federal Communications Commission to establish the principle that a broadcaster must make up his mind whether he wants to be in television or in radio. The longer this decision is delayed, the tougher it will be to effect the separation.

The FCC has certain weapons to protect the public from a deliberate policy of making radio obsolete. There is a rule that forbids "duopoly," and under it a broadcaster may not operate two competing stations in the same area. Special regulations affecting networks are also in existence, and the

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Commission has already given notice that it intends to reexamine these chain broadcast rules which date back to the less complex era of 1941. The radio v. video issue should be taken up at the same time. NBC's or CBS's or ABC's radio will not compete in good nature against its television arm forever. Something can be done about the situation now, before the listener discovers that the most he gets from his radio is the aural rebroadcast of a program originated for a television set he does not own.

Television is hard at work seeking to express itself in its own idiom. It isn't easy, as two new programs illustrate.

Abe Burrows runs his own half-hour "Almanac" on CBS-TV, Wednesday nights at nine. A couple of hours earlier, starting at 7:45, Goodman Ace and his wife Jane do a 15-minute stint on DuMont under the title, "Easy Aces," that brought them radio riches. The Aces succeed, Burrows fails sadly; yet both are among the most adult of comedy alumni from the sound studios.

The interesting point about these two programs is that, whereas Burrows tries to adapt his showmanship to the screen, the Aces get across by ignoring the fact that they can be seen. They chat away in a living-room set, exchanging their easy banter against a background of faded, old films that show New York in 1910 or "Our Jungle Friends" at feeding time. The films are absurdly unimportant; it's the conversation, dryly delivered, that counts. Since the Aces are expert in this department, the result is amusing—as long as it is kept to a quarter of an hour, and if one ignores the four commercials crowded into the period.

Burrows, on the other hand, tries a full-scale production, with assisting staff, guest stars and all. His own satirical material, which he was able to transfer effectively from hilarious private parties to the radio studio, is lost when he acts as a mere master of ceremonies. What he has is only another television variety show in a sea-

son when the air is much too full of them.

The search for television's unique quality is reported from various quarters. *Variety's* latest anniversary number—all two pounds, two and one-half ounces of it—is full of serious discussion about where video writing and directing are going. From the West Coast comes the latest issue of the *Hollywood Quarterly*, given over almost entirely to the same subject. There is substantial agreement that television is being molded either by

the director, who works off the cuff, or by the producer, who watches the all-important budget. In such circumstances, the writer counts for little.

Flora Rheta Schreiber, of Adelphi College, writing in the *Hollywood Quarterly*, insists that in the search for television's potentials she has ruled out programs that are merely "illustrated radio, or miniature movies, or . . . photographed stage plays." That left her—and me—with very little. But that little is worth a close, second look. I'll come back to it next week.

SAUL CARSON

MUSIC: Personnel Changes

AFTER THREE SEASONS of temporizing, since the cyclonic departure of Artur Rodzinski, the Philharmonic-Symphony Society of New York has finally chosen Dimitri Mitropoulos—instead of a staff of from two to five—to direct its 1950-51 season. For the orchestra, this decision should produce a well-planned, consistent artistic policy to replace the present helter-skelter batch of programs by a constantly shifting lineup of short-term celebrities. For Mitropoulos, it means full status as one of the leading conductors of the world.

Though he is as bald as an eagle, the Philharmonic's 53-year-old, Greek-born conductor is full of youth and enterprise. When he took over the orchestra in the ninth week of the fall, he immediately awakened the players and the audience, both of whom had been plunged into lethargy by Leopold Stokowski's desultory ways and general lack of initiative. During Christmas week, Mitropoulos presented three times a concert version of Strauss's "Elektra" that has already become one of the legendary musical achievements of the decade. On these occasions, Carnegie Hall resounded with such ovations as no conductor has evoked since Toscanini.

Faced by the threat of rising costs and declining attendance, the Philharmonic board could not afford to ig-

nore a director who could make 9,000 listeners stand up and yell. Mitropoulos may not yet have become a first-rate conductor in every respect; but no musician of his generation, impeded in its early stage by the disruptive years of the First World War, has attained the supreme mastery of a Toscanini, a Koussevitzky, a Monteux or an Ansermet. From the men currently in the field, Mitropoulos is as happy a choice as the Philharmonic could have made. His musical sympathies are broad, embracing both old music and new; and his genuine devotion to the art is reflected in the attitude of the players, many of whom took home their parts in Roger Sessions' Second Symphony because they felt they could not learn to play it well enough in the allotted union rehearsal time.

The Chicago Symphony Orchestra, which toyed with Rodzinski for a single season after his departure from New York, and then also lapsed into dependence upon guest conductors, has announced the importation of Rafael Kubelik, 35-year-old son of the famous Czech violinist, Jan Kubelik, as musical director for next season. Except for a brief term as guest conductor in Chicago this fall, which met with a mixed response in the press, Kubelik's qualifications remain to be proved. Whatever its ar-

istic outcome, the action of the Chicago board shows a discouraging willingness to rely on Europe as the fount of musical authority, in the face of the superb, fully demonstrated talents of such young Americans as Leonard Bernstein, Daniel Saidenberg, and Max Goberman, the conductor for Ballet Theatre.

At the Metropolitan Opera, a portent of the future was provided by the resignation, as of next June, of Frank St. Leger, assistant general manager, and Earle Lewis, box-office treasurer. Since these two men have been kingpins in Edward Johnson's administrative structure, their move was a good deal like the resignation of cabinet members after the election of a new president. When Rudolf Bing takes over the management of the company at the end of the current season, he will be free to set up his own organization, unencumbered by the officials who have given the Johnson regime much of its coloration.

Though Bing has refrained from making any formal statement, sweeping changes in policy appear to be in store for the Metropolitan. Much to the distress of the San Francisco Opera, which has been using them in September and October, he has indicated that he will expect his singers to be on hand for several weeks of rehearsal before the Metropolitan season opens in early November. He considers the present repertory too large to permit adequate preparation of every opera (he must have been looking at some of the performances!), and he proposes to shrink the list considerably. He is mulling over various plans to increase revenue and decrease expenses; he may eliminate the ten expensive jaunts to Philadelphia and institute two alternating biweekly subscription series, like the "odd" and "even" series of the Philharmonic, to make each production serve twice as many listeners. And he is apparently determined to prune some of the dead wood from the roster, for he has intimated that he will reaudition every singer whose

abilities he does not already know. Like the Philharmonic, the Metropolitan is ready to start the new half-century with a clean slate.

Records. Several new vocal recordings have appeared recently:

Puccini: "Madama Butterfly." The third, and least successful, of the full-length operatic recordings issued by the Metropolitan Opera Association. Eleanor Steber, who sings the title role, has never appeared in the part at the Metropolitan. She destroys all illusion of the fragile, 15-year-old Cio-Cio-San by driving the music too hard. Jean Madeira, as Suzuki, is woolly-voiced, and Giuseppe Valdengo, as the American consul, is uninteresting and monotonous. The chief redeeming features of the recording, apart from its lifelike sound, are the expert conducting of Max Rudolf and the handsome vocalism of Richard Tucker, who is rapidly becoming the finest American tenor (Columbia).

Operatic Arias. A variety of excerpts, largely from Verdi operas, sung variably by Richard Tucker. Those made two or three years ago are a little tentative in interpretation and a little tight in sound. Those made more recently—among them the best "Celeste Aida" since Caruso—are gloriously free in tone and masterful in style (Columbia).

Songs. Licia Albanese is reported to be RCA Victor's best-selling operatic soprano. In this hodgepodge of songs from Scarlatti to Campbell-Tipton, she reveals little beyond the confident assurance of the experienced troupier, for she sings every song as loud as possible, and lets it go at that (RCA Victor).

Beethoven: Scotch Songs; Irish Songs. Nobody admires Helen Traubel's luxurious voice more than I do, but Beethoven's settings of British folk songs are singularly methodical and colorless, and Miss Traubel's earnestness, which is her most praiseworthy attribute as an artist, is hardly enough to make them interesting (Columbia).

CECIL SMITH

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